The concept of biodiversity has been historically constituted by a series of North-South disputes over its meaning and application. The following chapter places the entry of biodiversity into international environmental law within its historical and political context and outlines the exposure and collisions with other discourses and rationalities that occurred around the adoption and early operation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). While the concept of biodiversity emerged within Northern conservation practice, the reality of the South as the holder of the remaining biodiversity reserves has forced a continued and often contentious engagement with the political economy of Southern development. The chapter identifies a troubling orientalist pattern in this engagement that repeats throughout the decades: the North always proposes first and the South is expected to reacts and adapt.
 INTRODUCTION
Biodiversity has been a difficult concept to define with clarity, and biological diversity has been an environmental public good difficult to measure with precision and protect with confidence against multiple threats, such as habitat loss, pollution, climate change and overharvesting.
This has been largely attributed to the pluralism of the term itself1, constituting both a normative concept that sets out the environmental and other values to be pursued in conservation2, as well as a scientific description of the natural world structured across the three tiers of genetic, species and ecosystem variability3. In simple terms, it constitutes a method for both knowing and valuing nature. The two understandings are often interlinked4, and often used to strongly advocate a holistic practice of biodiversity conservation rooted in ecological ethics and unashamedly valueladen assessments of a rapidly evolving environmental crisis5. The early proponents of biodiversity regarded themselves as belonging to a 'mission-oriented' discipline6. Other conservationists eventually grew frustrated with the all-encompassing aspect of the idea as well as ' (1999) 13 Conservation Biology 444 6 For an early statement of this approach see Michael E. Soule and Bruce A. Wilcox (eds) , Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary-Ecological Perspective (Sinauer 1980) , at 1. the failure to distinguish or prioritize between the three levels, dismissing biodiversity as essentially meaningless7. This is quite clearly a snapshot of a larger debate occurring for decades in Northern environmental discourse essentially between conservationists and policy makers regarding the most effective conservation methods. However, the framing of the problem of biodiversity loss inherently implies a transboundary, if not global, perspective. Hence, the entry of biodiversity into international environmental law was inevitable.
The following chapter seeks to place this entry of biodiversity within a historical and political context and to outline the exposure and collisions with other discourses and rationalities that occurred around the adoption and early operation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). By adopting this historical perspective, the chapter shows that the initial generic problematisation of conservation practices in the North was swiftly enveloped within the broader problematisation of the South itself. Since then, the North-South dynamic in biodiversity has followed a pattern whereby the South is always responding to Northern proposals.
 MALTHUS, OVERPOPULATION AND LIMITS: STEPS TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIODIVERSITY
In the 'bible of biodiversity'8, the proceedings of a symposium of the US National Academy of Sciences held in 1986 where the term was first preconsolidated9, a neo-Malthusian perspective had emerged as central to the discussion of the causes of biodiversity loss. Habitat erosion or 7 On such a rejection from a practitioners perspective see R.A. Lautenschlager, 'Biodiversity is Dead ' (1997) 25 Wildlife Society Bulletin 679; Sarkar also makes similar points regarding the absurdity of biodiversity meaning everything in biology 8 The characterisation is indicative of the continuing importance of the edited collection and borrowed from Michael Flitner, 'Biodiversity: Of Local Commons and Global Commodities' in Michael Goldman (ed), Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons (Pluto Press 1998) at 145. 9 Edward O. Wilson (ed) , BioDiversity (National Academy Press 1988) destruction due to the expansion of human population and its attendant activities was identified as the primary cause for the decline of biodiversity10. By consequence, halting population growth was the key 'dramatic step' to be taken in order to arrest the rising rates of extinction and extirpation, as well as severe degradation of ecosystem services11. This chapter on the causes and consequences of biodiversity loss was written by Paul Ehrlich, at the time one of the main proponents of population control as environmental policy. Some historical background will explain why the incorporation of this line of thinking profoundly affected the North-South dynamic in biodiversity discourse.
The general prediction that human society is bound to collapse under the pressure of producing enough resources to sustain its ever-growing population of course can be traced to the theory of population of Thomas Malthus. We can now interpret Malthus as opposing the Enlightenment view of continuing social, political and economic progress on what we would call ecological grounds12. Due to the limits of the land, any increases in agricultural production will inevitably fail to keep pace with the additional population growth that comes from such progress, further exacerbating poverty, hunger and disease13. Malthusian demography also possesses a strong normative element. He argued against the passing of Poor laws of England14 on the basis that any help would facilitate an increase in the already unsustainable (as evidenced by their plight) population of the 'lower social orders' and thus exacerbate the difficulty of agricultural production to keep pace with population growth. According to this view, in reality these laws would only prolong their suffering by removing the preventive and positive checks on their numbers15, to the detriment of society as a whole. growth' thesis18, the first major application of computer modelling in the service of environmental predictions. The limits to growth approach argued for the reduction of human population growth, the abandonment of the pursuit of continuous economic growth and the move towards a 'steady-state economy' as solutions for preventing global ecosystemic collapse.
The next major step was the inveigling within the emerging concept of biodiversity, as highlighted in the beginning of this section.
One of the many criticisms against this re-emergence of Malthusian demographics -and the one most relevant for this chapter's examination of biodiversity -was precisely its rather crude attempt to recast North-South relations. By substituting 'poor nations' for Malthus' 'lower social classes', reactionary -masquerading as realist or pragmatic -arguments against development assistance and even food aid were made, on the basis that such efforts would prevent the necessary reduction in human population to avert global ecological catastrophe19. Such arguments led to accusations of barbarism20. Making what is presented as a factual and neutral argument that 'overpopulation' is the primary cause of environmental problems has very clear normative implications for the South, given the difference with the low rates of population growth in the industrialised North. It not only depicts the environmental impact of the South as the primary challenge, conveniently obfuscating the role of overconsumption and the histories of colonialism and imperialism that produced the loss of habitat, ecosystem degradation, poverty, hunger and disease claimed as the indicators of 'too many people'. It also, and perhaps more worryingly, channels Malthus's distaste and negativity towards the poor, to produce a racist and neo-colonial image of the South as a mass of people, plagued by poverty, famine and disease, threatening to engulf the whole planet21. Such perceptions were doubly unfortunate during the 1970s, when the call for a 'New International
Economic Order' and an increased role for the South in the international system was being articulated. Unsurprisingly, the method of framing global environmental problems using
Malthusian limits was heavily contested by the South acting as a collective and did not bode well for the legitimacy of the at the time nascent global environmental governance22.
Yet the emphasis on population by way of habitat loss found its way into the conceptualisation of biodiversity. This emphasis exposed biodiversity to larger debates regarding fairness and equity in international relations and the historical responsibility for the current environmental crisis, which are profoundly affected by the claim that overpopulation trumps overconsumption as the source of environmental problems. These debates escape the narrow confines of Northern environmentalism and are located within the broader 'politics of the Earth'23. This exposure produced an interesting epistemological effect. These controversial debates required knowledge of the history and political economy of the South itself; and its absence might explain some of the statements of conservationists on the basis of naivety, as opposed to commitment to certain reactionary politics. But the concept was no longer describing and organizing the natural world, but also the South itself; hence the need for the different forms of knowledge and the realisation that a certain political economy of the South had to constitute part of how biodiversity was to be understood. Such a process would not be devoid of its own quite considerable and long-standing intellectual baggage.
 THE 'TROPICS' AND THE SHIFT IN NEGOTIATING BASIS FOR THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The focus on the South as the place where biodiversity is most endangered due to the encroachment of human population was not only supported by neo-Malthusian conceptions of the South, but also by the scientific recognition that the rainforests actually hold the majority of the world's remaining biodiversity reserves24. Biodiversity signalled the capacity of biological knowledge to provide scientific evidence -in the shape of estimates of numbers of various microorganisms, plants, insects and animals being under threat -of the global environmental value and importance of Southern ecosystems. Although the assumptions of the overpopulation thesis could be readily questioned, the importance of rainforests for the functioning of the global Earth system could not be challenged on a similar political economic basis. Biodiversity conservation thus attached crucial environmental value to areas, such as the rainforests, previously considered a burden and a sign of 'underdevelopment', albeit with the provision of these areas containing the requisite amount of high diversity. However, this Even the idea of forming an oligopoly, a cartel of 'megabiodiverse' countries to secure royalty payments, the option value and other economic returns on the areas of high biodiversity that would be protected and thus remain 'undeveloped' has been proposed in the context of this line of thought32.
The existence of this leverage became progressively apparent from the very first few hesitant steps towards an international biodiversity treaty taking place at the UNEP negotiating table from 1988 onwards33. Given how the stakes were raised in terms of the fundamental role of biodiversity held by the South for human survival itself, it was logical to expect significant 30 The 'official stance' and some of these negotiating tactics are astutely summarised in R. Jayakumar Nayar additional funding for relevant conservation initiatives, and the question of funding levels and arrangements of the financial mechanism of the proposed treaty dominated early discussions34.
This was the specific manifestation of the test of Northern commitment to the discourse of biodiversity discussed above, but also served as a path for establishing the legitimacy of the emerging global biodiversity regime as a multilateral endeavour. In addition, the Brundtland Report35 included a 'priority proposal' to 'investigate the prospect of agreeing to a 'species convention', similar in spirit and scope to the Law of the Sea Treaty'36. This 'species convention'
would be a type of framework treaty that rationalises and codifies customary law and principles regarding nature conservation, but also extend to unifying disparate existing international treaty regimes37; under a legal approach to biodiversity as common heritage that was based on the biosphere-influenced approach of living resource conservation enshrined in the earlier World Conservation Strategy38.
Given the leverage, this was not the kind of framework treaty that was eventually signed, since the CBD text confirmed the principle of state sovereignty over biological resources39, and by extension over any crucial biodiversity hotspots. Attribution of common heritage to these resources was reduced to a preambular affirmation that their conservation constitutes a common concern, again pointing towards additional funding arrangements at the international level. On the other hand, the funding from the North also failed to materialise to a level comparable to the significant importance attached to biodiversity. Following the pattern of similar environmental negotiations on going at the time, these outcomes were quite often attributed to Southern interests. Conceptions of biodiversity as an economic opportunity and a way to make up lost development ground would be taken to infer an absence of commitment to environmental objectives or a push back against the benevolent 'greening' of international law.
However, if we connect these negotiating tactics and choices to the Malthusian leanings of the biodiversity concept, it becomes clear that at least equal responsibility for such an outcome (if indeed it is to be seen as contrary to certain environmental principles or goals) must be assigned to the rushed universalisation of a concept of biodiversity formulated with the relative narrow confines of North American academia and Northern environmental philosophy regarding the value of nature, and with little appreciation of the history of international law and international relations into which such a concept would be tapping. The creation of megabiodiverse states and the depiction of the human population in these states as a dangerous human mass might be more or less controversial depending on one's ecological understandings of the causes of a global environmental crisis; but such ideas do not make for smooth international diplomacy.
 MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF BIODIVERSITY
In the early years of the CBD, the echo of a conservation framework treaty and the emergence of a complex political economy of biodiversity beyond conservation priorities produced contrarian reinterpretations of the goals of the CBD by Northern environmental thought that sought to protect international environmental law from encroachment from the Southern interests identified above. This was often identified through the reintroduction of aspects of the common heritage doctrine jettisoned from the main treaty text. Alan Boyle noted that the CBD 'represents an attempt... to internationalise, in a more comprehensive and inclusive way, the conservation and sustainable use of nature'40, lamenting how previous agreements 'fall short of establishing a comprehensive global regime for the protection of nature, and largely leave untouched resources located wholly within a state's own national boundaries'41. In similar vein, Swanson argued that the CBD was supposed to achieve 'the centralised management of global land use planning'42, and that it exists 'as a monument along the pathway of increasingly active intervention in the process of national development planning and decision-making'43. Such forms of internationalised and centralised intervention were simply incongruent with the NorthSouth dynamic at the inception of the CBD, notwithstanding the fact that the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development had imposed limits on state sovereignty over natural resources44.
In any event by that point in the early 1990s, the discourse was fully shifting away from conservation altogether and the North was once again instrumental in this shift. The above forms of intervention, with their costly reliance on implementation through global financial mechanisms and additional Northern funding commitments, were actually deemed unnecessary in the specific field of biodiversity. The answer to the question of how biodiversity conservation could be made possible without access to significant financial resources was to substitute sustainable utilisation for conservation. 
 CONCLUSION
The above extracts from the history of the North South dynamic have been chosen to illuminate a dominant repetitive pattern in thinking about biodiversity, which is simply that the North proposes and the South reacts and adapts. This is a worrying pattern, and has been criticised through the lens of orientalism:
'For green orientalists, as for their colonial forebears, all real knowledge, consciousness and power rest with the North. In environmental matters, as in others, they assume it is up to the North not only to explain, inspire and lead the South, but also to power it and teach it about itself'58.
In this sense, the revolving North-South dynamic that has fuelled the development of 
